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SYSTEMIC HARMS AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE
John Armour* and Jeffrey N. Gordon**
A B S T R A C T
The financial crisis has demonstrated serious flaws in the corporate governance of sys-
temically important financial firms. In particular, the norm that managers should seek to
maximize shareholder value, as measured by the stock price, proves to be a faulty guide
for managerial action in systemically important firms. This is not only because the failure
of such firms will have spillovers that defy the cost-internalization of the tort system, but
also because these spillovers will harm their own majoritarian shareholders. The interests
of diversified shareholders fundamentally diverge from the interests of managers and
other controllers because the failure of a systemically important financial firm will pro-
duce losses throughout a diversified portfolio, not just own-firm losses. Among the
consequences: the business judgment rule protection that makes sense for officers
and directors of a non-financial firm leads to excessive risk-taking in a systemically im-
portant financial firm. To encourage appropriate modification of incentives, we propose
officer and director liability rules as a complement to (and substitute for) the prescriptive
rules that have emerged from the financial crisis.
1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N
The generally accepted framework for analyzing corporate law and governance
implies that those running a corporation should seek to maximize the value of
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shareholders’ claims, as measured by the stock price. Where shareholders are
numerous and widely dispersed, they have little incentive to engage actively in
the firm’s decision making. The standard concern of corporate governance is
that the firm will consequently be run in the interests of its managers, rather
than its shareholders. A range of mechanisms encourage managers instead to
make decisions as diversified shareholders would, were these shareholders not
beset by collective action problems.
If the firm had only one shareholder, there would be no coordination costs.
The actions that a sole owner would want therefore form a heuristic for desir-
able managerial conduct. A sole owner would want to maximize the value of
their claims. Corporate governance mechanisms thus encourage managers to
maximize the value of shareholders’ claims. Shares in widely held firms are
traded on capital markets, which—if they are informationally efficient—func-
tion to aggregate into the stock price all publicly available information relevant
to the value of diversified shareholders’ claims.1 This provides a useful way to
implement the maximization of the value of shareholders’ claims: that is, to
encourage managers to maximize the share price. The share price increases in
response to activities that increase the value of shareholders’ claims, as a sole
owner would wish.
Unlike a sole owner, the portfolios of diversified shareholders are insulated
from the effects of idiosyncratic (firm-specific) risks. Diversified shareholders
consequently want the firm to take more risks than would a sole owner.
Managers are undiversified, because they have human capital tied up with
their firm. Corporate governance mechanisms consequently encourage man-
agers to take risks as if they were diversified. Because participants in the market
are typically diversified, prices will reflect their preferences as to risk—that is,
they will not take into account idiosyncratic risk. In short, given efficient capital
markets, focusing managers’ efforts on share price maximization will reduce
agency costs whilst at the same time ensuring the firm’s decisions are made
without regard to idiosyncratic risk.
U.S. corporate governance consequently seeks to focus managers’ incentives
on maximizing the stock price. For example, policy thinking about executive
pay and the market for corporate control is largely premised on tying manager-
ial welfare to the performance of the share price (Jensen & Murphy 1990;
Bebchuk & Fried 2004, pp. 15–22). We refer to managerial practice intended
1 To the extent that the stock market is not informationally efficient, it may be possible for managers
to do a better job of maximizing the value of the shareholders’ residual claims by other means than
maximizing the stock price. The debate about this issue, which has been widely canvassed elsewhere,
does not form part of the critique in this article. See eg Gilson & Kraakman (1988); Stout (2002);
Fisch (2003); Stout (2012, pp. 63–73).
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to maximize the stock price as shareholder value maximization, or “SVM” for
short; to corporate governance mechanisms that encourage this as “SVM mech-
anisms”, and the consensus that managers ought to do this as the “SVM norm”.
By mitigating internal agency costs, SVM also tends to enhance social welfare
in a large range of circumstances.2 This is most obvious if the firm’s activities
have no adverse impact on third parties. However, where a firm’s activities do
have adverse impacts on third parties, a range of legal mechanisms—contracts,
liability rules and regulation—act to ensure these costs are internalized into the
firm’s profit function. Where these internalization mechanisms function effect-
ively, then shareholders ultimately bear the social costs of harmful activities, just
as would a sole owner. Consequently SVM mechanisms, by aligning the inter-
ests of managers with shareholders’, operate virtuously to encourage managers
to take social costs into account.
This attractive result as regards social costs depends on the internalization
mechanisms actually doing their job. If the firm’s owners don’t bear the full
social costs of their activities, then SVM will encourage managers to act in a way
that increases social costs. It’s not news that these internalization mechanisms
do not function perfectly. Yet the accommodation generally made by those
studying corporate governance is to observe that any such failure implies a
weakness of these internalization mechanisms, not the idea of SVM. SVM
offers many benefits in terms of managerial accountability, and if problems
of internalization can be solved by enhanced external measures, these are clearly
preferable.
In our view, the recent financial crisis calls this accommodation into question
as regards financial firms whose activities are systemically important. We make
three claims. First, the extent to which traditional private law mechanisms—in
particular, the law of tort—fail to internalize systemic harms has been under-
appreciated. The activities of large financial institutions can cause economic
losses to large numbers of parties through indirect and diffuse causal channels.
But tort law is primarily concerned with direct physical harms: purely financial
or “economic” losses are generally not recoverable. Moreover, because there is a
causal relationship between financial-firm bankruptcy and systemic losses, ex
post liability for the firm is not an effective internalization tool. For a firm to
face liability only in states of the world in which it is bankrupt will undermine
liability’s deterrent effect. What is worse, such deterrence is undermined by the
likelihood of government bailouts calculated to avoid financial firm bankrupt-
cies and consequent realization of systemic harms. Consequently private law
2 A point famously made by Milton Friedman (1970).
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does not do an “imperfect job” of internalizing systemic harms; it does no
job at all.
Where private law is unable to do the work of internalization, it is generally
thought that regulation is a desirable response (e.g., Shavell 2004, pp. 92–101).
Our second claim is that SVM mechanisms create incentives for firms system-
atically to undermine the efficacy of regulatory internalization. Rather than
innovation that reduces the social costs of one’s activities in accordance with
regulatory strictures, the cheapest way to maximize shareholder returns may be
to exercise political influence to achieve a lower rate of regulatory “tax”. The
upshot is that whatever the extent of the work that may be done by regulation,
SVM will tend systematically to undermine it.
The case of banks illustrates dramatically the problems of SVM in relation to
systemic harms. The failure of a bank can trigger harms both to other banks and
to nonfinancial firms that might have used it as a source of credit. Thus bank
risk-taking has a systematic, as opposed to idiosyncratic (firm-specific), char-
acter. Yet bank executives who had the strongest incentives to maximize the
value of bank shares—as reflected in stock-based compensation, oversight by
independent directors, and shareholder power—worked at the firms that took
the greatest risks and suffered the greatest losses (Pathan 2009; Fortin,
Goldberg, & Roth 2010; Beltratti & Stulz 2012; Erkens Hing, & Matos 2012).
And regulators’ ability to control such activity was undermined by sophisticated
exploitation of regulatory gaps and well-organized lobbying from the banking
sector.
Financial regulation has been strengthened, and regulators better resourced,
around the world. We do not doubt that this will improve matters to some
extent. However, the structural problems we identify remain: tort law contrib-
utes nothing to control this tendency and SVM pushes managers hard to under-
mine regulation. Hence in our view it is unsafe to rely on regulation alone.
To augment regulatory changes, we propose a modification to the corporate
governance of systemic firms. Because SVM generates particularly pernicious
incentives as regards systemic harms, we argue that the mechanisms encoura-
ging it should be relaxed for such firms.3 Relaxing SVM mechanisms would
3 In so doing, we regard some early policy responses to the financial crisis, which assumed that
problems arose because managers of financial firms were not sufficiently focused on SVM, to
have been misdirected. The Dodd-Frank Act, for example, contains various corporate governance
provisions, including authorization for SEC adoption of rules expanding shareholder access to the
management proxy and provision for a shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation,
so-called “say on pay”, §§ 971, 951, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1375, 1915, 1899 (2010). Similarly, the UK government-com-
missioned review by Sir Derek Walker (2009) of bank corporate governance concluded that greater
engagement by shareholders was desirable.
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reduce managers’ incentives to maximize profits, and as a result, impose less
social costs. According to the standard accommodation, this would come at the
expense of increased agency costs between managers and shareholders. Our
third claim is that, where the harms are systemic, relaxing the SVM norm
does not increase agency costs. This is because the firm’s majoritarian diversi-
fied shareholders would prefer that the managers did not impose systemic
externalities. The SVM norm presupposes that investors can diversify away
risks associated with the project choices of individual firms and consequently
that the share price is the sole benchmark of shareholder utility. The undiver-
sifiable component of an investor’s portfolio risk—that is, “market risk”—is
taken to be exogenous to individual firms’ activities. However, if the failure of
one firm’s projects may impose costs on other firms generally then this increases
the correlation of investors’ returns, and consequently the undiversifiable por-
tion of their risk. For this to be the case, the externalities associated with the
firm’s projects must have a sufficiently general character as to affect the econ-
omy at large, rather than a few specific firms, and so not be amenable to
diversification. Costs to other firms will not be fully reflected in the share
price of the individual firm selecting the project. Consequently share price
maximization can in the presence of systemic externalities lead to reduced
portfolio returns to investors. In relation to projects with such potential con-
sequences, diversified investors should not want managers to single-mindedly
maximize share prices. As a result, a system in which “shareholder value” is
interpreted as share price maximization is not aligning managers’ interests with
those of diversified shareholders, at least as regards systemic risks.
We make the case for the imposition of liability rules for directors and of-
ficers of banks. Such liability, appropriately structured, makes agents behave in
a more risk-averse fashion, which the conventional wisdom underpinning the
business judgment rule suggests is contrary to the interests of diversified share-
holders. Our analysis reveals that when a firm’s actions affect systemic risk, the
conventional wisdom is reversed: diversified shareholders want managers to
take less risk. This undercuts the case for business judgment protection. We
argue that director and officer liability has a potentially useful role to play in
circumscribing the limits of SVM. Such liability would be owed to the firm, and
could be triggered by a derivative action following the occurrence of significant
losses.
A particular merit of this proposal is that imposition of liability in the form
we suggest does not presuppose, or itself trigger, the bankruptcy of the firm.
The bankruptcy of a systemically important firm may be an event that causes
systemic losses. Consequently politicians are willing to spend large amounts of
public funds in order to avoid the bankruptcy of such firms. A liability regime
that could only be triggered by, or which itself caused, such a bankruptcy would
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have its deterrent effect undermined by the probability that a bailout of some
sort would be engineered. Our proposal is for liability that is triggered by
significant losses to the firm—and thereby to its shareholders—to which dir-
ectors’ and/or officers’ misconduct contributed. Diversified shareholders thus
act as a proxy for society in enforcing claims against those making the firm’s
decisions. The liability regime would deter risk-taking that might endanger the
firm’s financial health.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we motivate the
discussion by describing how large financial firms can generate systemic harms,
with reference to the recent financial crisis. Section 3 considers how the usual
mechanisms for controlling externalities fail to function in relation to systemic
financial firms. Section 4 then shows how the pursuit of SVM, in the presence of
systemic financial externalities, may diverge from the interests of diversified
shareholders. Section 5 considers whether financial firms are unique in posing
these problems. In Section 6, we turn to possible solutions, making the case for
a duty of care in relation to controllers of systemic financial firms as a com-
plement to ongoing regulatory changes. Section 7 sketches the contours of such
a regime, and Section 8 concludes.
At the outset, we should emphasize that we are far surer of the significance of
the problem we document than we are of the efficacy of our proposed solutions,
which we present primarily as a heuristic framework for debate.
2 . F I N A N C I A L F I R M S A N D S Y S T E M I C H A R M S
Our inquiry is motivated by the recent financial crisis, which starkly showed the
potential for banks’ activities to impose losses on society. These losses are
characteristically widely diffused, indirect and in aggregate very large. They
are “systemic” in the sense that they adversely impact a wide cross-section of
actors in the economic system.
The most obvious occasion for triggering such losses is bank failure. In the
first instance, this is because of the possibility of contagion to other financial
firms—that is, the failure of one triggers the failure of others. Banks are struc-
turally vulnerable, even fragile, because their business model depends on mana-
ging (“transforming”) the mismatch between deposits, which must be low-risk
and highly liquid, and illiquid loans to higher risk borrowers (Mishkin 2010, Ch
10; Gordon & Muller 2011, pp. 158–166). Of course banks actively manage this
mismatch, but they are vulnerable to events that trigger a sudden increase in
demand for liquidity, or a decline in the value of their liquid assets, which in
each case can trigger financial distress (Freixas & Rochet 2008, Ch 7). Many
nonbank financial institutions face similar structural fragility: it is present
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whenever the firm’s business finances long-term (high-risk) assets with short-
term (low-risk) debt. We will throughout refer to “banks” and “financial insti-
tutions” interchangeably, and the analysis applies to any financial firm that
shares this structural fragility.
Problems at one bank are often transmitted to others, a process known as
contagion. It is most pronounced for other financial firms that are highly con-
nected to a failed institution (Kaufman 1994; Dumontaux & Pop 2013), and
that are themselves particularly fragile (Swary 1986; Brewer et al. 2003; cf. Wall
& Peterson 1990). An obvious channel is through direct connections between
balance sheets, where liabilities of one institution are assets of others, which
become devalued on its financial distress (Schwarcz 2008, p. 247). Contagion
can also be driven by correlation in investment strategies. Fire-sale liquidation
of assets by a distressed firm depresses their market value and hurts the balance
sheets of other firms holding the same asset class (Acharya 2009). Contagion
can also occur across the liabilities side of firms’ balance sheets, where short-
term funders (e.g. depositors) infer from the failure of one bank that others
with similar business models are also likely to face difficulties, provoking a run
on them too (Chari & Jagannathan 1988; Gorton 1988). These channels can
interact with one another to compound their effects (Haldane & May 2011).
Contagion between financial institutions is problematic for society, because
these firms perform pivotal functions for the “real” economy. Commercial
banks not only supply credit but also act as repositories of human capital for
making effective lending decisions and monitoring the performance of debtors.
Failure of a large bank can disrupt these activities and leave would-be borrowers
without substitutes. Good business projects go unfunded, or face premature
liquidation (Bernanke 1983).4 A large empirical literature seeks to quantify
these financial distress costs, which is summarized in Table 1.5 Commercial
banks also contribute to the payments system, a crucial piece of infrastructure
for the economy (Independent Commission on Banking 2011, 3.20-21, 5.7).
Similarly, investment banks perform a screening function for underwriting
clients, who consequently suffer losses if these banks fail (Fernando, May, &
Megginson 2012).
The combination of fragility, contagion, and importance for the real econ-
omy means that bank failure can create externalities: social losses exceed those
suffered by bank investors. We take a “systemic” institution to be one whose
4 The identification of this “credit channel” through which banks add value was one of the contri-
butions upon which Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors during the
financial crisis, made his name as an academic economist.
5 While the majority of studies report significant costs associated with bank failure along the lines
described in the text, a minority do not.
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failure could through these channels cause significant externalities. For ex-
ample, the market capitalization of Lehman Bros, Inc. peaked on January 29,
2007 at approximately $60 billion, and the high-water market capitalization of
all the US “crisis banks”—those that either failed or required assistance to
survive—totaled approximately $1.2 trillion.6 These numbers put an upper
bound on the value of the firms to shareholders. They are large sums, yet the
fallout from the crisis was much larger. One measure is the cost of subsequent
rescue efforts: this indicates how much policymakers were willing to spend to
avoid what they believed would be even greater social losses. Table 2 summar-
izes commitments made by the US government to the financial sector over
2008–2009. Whilst many of these were not called upon in full, the USA suffered
net fiscal outlays from the various programs amounting to 3.6 percent of GDP,
or $5 trillion (Schildbach 2010, pp. 3–4). And despite these efforts, the US
economy contracted by 3.5 percent in the immediately following year 2009,
down from growth of 2.8 percent in 2007—a loss equivalent to approximately
$9 trillion (International Monetary Fund 2011, p. 2). These sums of course do
not count costs incurred elsewhere around the world: government commit-
ments to support the financial sector peaked at an astonishing 70 percent of
GDP in the UK (Bank of England 2009, p. 6), and averaged 40 percent of GDP
across the EU (European Commission 2011, p. 2). While these figures obviously
can be no more than a rough approximation of social cost, the gulf between
social and private losses is clear.
We might be tempted to dismiss these social costs as mere “pecuniary”
externalities; that is, consequences of one firm’s actions that impact solely on
the prices of factors of production (namely, capital) for other firms (Scitovsky
1954). Ordinarily, pecuniary externalities are left out of account in assessing
social welfare, because they cancel out in aggregate: one firm’s loss is ordinarily
a competitor’s gain. However, the effect we are emphasizing is not simply a
change in the cost of capital; rather it is an adverse impact on the financial
system’s ability to overcome information asymmetries in the allocation of cap-
ital (Greenwald & Stiglitz 1986). It not only increases prices but induces greater
inaccuracy in the rationing of credit. This has the propensity to make both
lenders and (would-be) borrowers worse off.
6 The “crisis banks” failed, merged to avoid failure, or received special emergency assistance, and
consisted of Citigroup, AIG, Bank of America, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch,
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Wachovia, and Washington Mutual (Calomiris & Herring
2011). Stock market capitalization is derived from Wolfram Alpha, Yahoo! Finance, and author
computations from 10-Ks. This “high-water” mark sums the highest market capitalization reached
by each of the crisis banks during the 2006–2008 period, not the highest collective market capital-
ization of the group at any point during that period. It overstates the collective shareholder stake and
thus understates the private benefit/social cost mismatch.
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It is tolerably clear that the difficulties banks found themselves in by the fall of
2008 were the consequence of the pursuit of high-risk, high-return strategies by
bank executives. Such strategies earn good returns for shareholders, but
by raising the volatility of the firm’s cashflows, also increase the risk of its
failure, which triggers the externalities we have described. Why did the mech-
anisms ordinarily deployed to control externalities fail to do so for financial
firms?
3 . C O N T R O L L I N G E X T E R N A L I T I E S F R O M S Y S T E M I C A L L Y
I M P O R T A N T F I R M S
The consensus view is that the appropriate techniques for controlling extern-
alities are themselves external to firms: that is, they do not involve any modi-
fication to internal corporate governance commitments. We will consider
here three such mechanisms: contracts, liability rules, and regulation.
Provided they impound the true social costs of a firm’s activities into its cash-
flows, then SVM will harness managers’ efforts to achieve socially optimal
outcomes. Given the desirable properties of SVM in controlling agency costs
for shareholders, this seems a powerful argument against interference with core
corporate governance commitments. Unfortunately, the ability of external
mechanisms to impound social costs into systemically important financial
firms’ profit functions turns out to have been highly incomplete. More troub-
lingly still, SVM in some cases actually tends to undermine the efficacy of these
mechanisms.
Table 2. US financial sector relief commitments, 2008–2009
Agency / Program Beneficiary Mechanism Amount
committed
Federal Reserve Credit market participants Loans and guarantees $7.7 trillion





Treasury Money market mutual
funds
Guarantees to shareholders $1.6 trillion






Total commitments $11.7 trillion
Sources: Kuntz & Ivry (2011); Congressional Oversight Panel (2011, pp. 25–37); Authors’ calcula-
tions based on Investment Company Institute (2007, Table 38).
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3.1 Contractual Internalization
Ronald Coase (1960) famously pointed out that in many cases, supposed
“externalities” can in fact be impounded into a firm’s cashflows by contract.
In the context of banks, bondholders and other creditors can adjust the pricing
of their loans according to the expected risk of the bank’s default (Calomiris &
Carlson 2014). This forces the bank to take into account expected costs to
creditors. However, retail depositors typically do a poor job in pricing risk ex
ante.7 As a consequence, the USA like many other countries operates a system of
deposit insurance, whereby individual depositors have their claims against
banks insured by a regulatory agency, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC). In the event of bank failure, the agency pays out to the
depositors and is subrogated to their claims against the bank. However, the
“premium” paid to the agency for insuring deposits often does not reflect the
risk of a particular bank’s default.8 Thus neither retail depositors, nor deposit
insurers who fill their shoes, seem able effectively to contract so that banks
internalize the costs their default would impose on depositors. Moreover,
and crucially, costs of bank failure also fall heavily on parties who do not—
and cannot—contract with the bank. Anyone who relies on the payments
system, or who might in the future wish to obtain credit, can suffer losses
from bank failure. The failure of a systemically important bank, as noted pre-
viously, may affect other banks far beyond the extent of counterparty
relationships.
A well-meaning desire to mitigate such social losses leads governments to
provide “bailouts” for troubled financial institutions. However, this exacerbates
the problem of creditor moral hazard. The effect of bailouts is to provide ex post
insurance to nondepositor creditors of banks. Such creditors anticipate the
provision of insurance, even if no explicit guarantees are made, in turn reducing
the borrowing costs systemically important banks have to pay to engage in risk-
taking. Indeed, it is now a familiar argument that bank mergers were strongly
motivated to attain “Too Big to Fail” status, to get this funding discount (Noss
& Sowerbutts 2012; cf. Roe 2014). Consequently, even those creditors who
would be able to cause banks to internalize part of the social costs of their
risk-taking will fail to do so. The expectation of insurance undermines even
the partial internalization that would otherwise occur via contract.
7 Indeed, the nature of the credit transformation process makes it very difficult for depositors to
evaluate and price the bank’s risk ex ante. Part of the bank’s added value to the credit transformation
process is its expert assessment of projects in circumstances in which market-based pricing would
lead to substantial discounts.
8 The likely reasons for this are explained infra, section 3.3.
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3.2 Liability Rules: Tort Law
Tort liability is thought to function in a complementary way to contractual
allocation of costs. The dominant analytic move in private law is to view tort as
filling gaps where contractual resolution is not feasible ex ante (Calabresi 1971).
Given the considerable difficulties with contractual internalization, we might
imagine a role for tort liability as an alternative way of internalizing losses
associated with bank failure. It turns out, however, that tort law does no
useful work in internalizing systemic harms.
Tort law’s general restriction on liability for “pure economic” (indirect)
losses is an obvious problem (Bernstein 1998). This rule imposes a bar on
recovery for losses caused otherwise than as a direct result of physical harm
to persons or property.9 Take the case of an oil spill: businesses whose property
is physically contaminated are able to recover for business profits lost in direct
consequence. For example, a beachfront hotel might find ingress of oil into its
swimming pool, necessitating a period of closure to permit cleanup. The lost
profits for this period of closure might be recoverable as well as the direct costs
of the cleanup. However, those whose property is not physically harmed are
ordinarily unable to recover lost profits. For example, a hotel operating several
streets back from the beachfront, which experiences no direct contamination,
nevertheless suffers a sharp fall in profits because holidaymakers avoid the area
en masse having seen the oil spill on television.10 Applied to the financial sector,
the economic loss rule bars any liability grounded on (in)actions at financial
firms leading to lost contracting opportunities. There is no physical harm, only
economic.
Whether it is desirable for the economic loss rule to restrict recoveries for
systemic harms seems doubtful.11 But the difficulties of using tort liability to
control systemic financial harms go deeper than this rule. An underlying prob-
lem is that systemic financial harms are typically triggered by the bankruptcy of
a financial firm. If bankruptcy is the causal event, then the subsequent
imposition of liability will make no difference to the firm’s incentives in
non-bankruptcy states—liability is only triggered when the firm is already
9 Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co (1875) 10 QB 453, 457–458; Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co v. Flint,
275 US 303 (1927); Union Oil Co v. Oppen, 501 F 2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
10 BP agreed to take on liabilities for such indirect harm in settlement of regulatory penalties and
possible punitive damages in connection with the Deep Horizon/ Gulf Coast oil spill. But all parties
have understood the extraordinary nature of BP’s bargain. See In re: Deepwater Horizon v. BP
Exploration & Production, Inc, 710 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2014) (latest appellate review and affirmation
of broad settlement implementation).
11 The standard justification is that economic losses are usually pecuniary externalities: one party’s loss
is another’s gain (Bishop 1982; Goldberg 1994). However, this justification probably does not hold
for systemic harms (Schweizer 2007).
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judgment-proof.12 We might ponder the wisdom of the rules that grant bank
shareholders limited liability (Hansmann & Kraakman 1991); indeed, “double
liability” was the norm in many states until the 1930s (Macey & Miller 1992;
Esty 1998), though the historical UK experience suggests that unlimited share-
holder liability may have retarded the availability of credit for economic ex-
pansion (Haldane 2011b). But shareholder personal liability can be triggered
only if the firm actually goes bankrupt. And precisely because systemic firm
bankruptcy is a trigger for contagion, political actors have powerful incentives
to intervene with preemptive bailouts. Even if one firm is permitted to go
bankrupt, political and regulatory actors will strenuously intervene to avoid
the failure of other firms. Consequently, even if liability could be imposed on
shareholders in bankruptcy as a theoretical matter, deterrence would be under-
mined by the expectation of government intervention.
3.3 Regulation
The third well-known response to the problem of social costs posits that regu-
lators should impose a penalty or tax on an activity that generates negative
externalities, such that the full social cost of its activities are imposed upon the
firm (Pigou 1920, pp. 168–171). In the presence of appropriately-priced
Pigouvian taxes, then the firm has incentives either to reduce the level of the
activity in question, or to take precautions against harm up to the extent to
which they are socially cost-justified. Under such circumstances, SVM operates
virtuously. Because social costs have been factored into the firm’s bottom line,
then the share price will reflect residual returns after social costs are taken into
account. SVM therefore focuses managers’ attention on ways of reducing the
social cost of the activities in question.13
More precisely, SVM focuses managers’ attention on ways of reducing the
regulatory burden that the firm incurs on its activities, much like the firm
would seek to minimize any other tax. One approach is to innovate new
ways of performing the activity in question that yield lower social costs. This
both reduces social costs and increases shareholder profits, so is clearly desir-
able. Proponents of regulation commonly assume such innovation to be a
desirable side-effect of the imposition of Pigouvian taxes. However, there are
other ways to enhance shareholder value, which are not socially desirable.
12 Squire (2010) offers an analysis of this feature of financial firm bankruptcy in relation to incentives
to shift risks to creditors.
13 We speak of “Pigouvian taxes” broadly to include regulations that impose costs on the firm by ruling
out its preferred conduct in light of the potential risks of social harm. Because of the difficulties with
harm computation and single firm Pigouvian tax assessments, rules have become a complement as
well as a substitute to increased capital requirements that may read more directly as a tax.
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One alternative is for the firm to exploit differences between textbook and
real-world regulators, which generate what we term “regulatory slack”. These
differences include the under-specification of regulatory norms, which leave
space for discretionary action by firms; under-enforcement owing to scarcity of
regulatory resources; and information asymmetries between managers and
regulators regarding the firm’s conduct, which favor the firm over regulators.14
In other words, weaknesses in the implementation of real-world regulation
leave gaps in the types of activities priced into the regulatory tax. A firm
pursuing SVM now has a choice: either innovate new processes (as conven-
tional theory implies) or reorient its activities so that they fall more squarely
within the gaps. Of course if regulatory arbitrage, rather than innovation, is
pursued, then the social costs of the firm’s activities are not internalized.
The financial crisis provides many examples of regulatory slack. For example,
US banks have long been subject to minimum capital requirements based on
both risk-weighted assets and a minimum leverage ratio of Tier 1 capital
(Carnell, Macey, & Miller 2013, pp. 215–232; Tarullo 2011). Firms exploited
these regulations in many ways: “risk weighting” was flouted by loading up on
the riskiest assets within a risk class (Le Lesle & Avramova 2012; Sas & Sy 2012);
leverage was flouted by the creation of entities that qualified as “off balance
sheet” for accounting purposes but were supported by the bank’s explicit and
implicit guarantees (US Treasury 2013); capital was degraded by the use of
various hybrid securities that were less dilutive to common shareholders but
did not sustain investor confidence in a crisis.15
Whether arbitrage will be pursued will depend on its costs to the firm, rela-
tive to innovation. In this context, SVM mechanisms actually give managers of
widely held firms worse incentives than those of sole owners under equivalent
circumstances. This is because SVM is implemented in a way that seeks to
14 A related concern is that regulators have inferior knowledge to firms as to sources of systemic risk, an
information asymmetry that firms may exploit. For example, the Basel II accord permitted banks to
use “advanced methods” to compute own-firm risk-weighted assets to compute required capital on
the basis of in-house measures of riskiness. As respects trading assets, this relied on the Value at Risk
(“VAR”) framework. VAR is a measure of the maximum potential exposure of a portfolio over a
specified period of time and within a specified confidence interval (Jorion 2007, pp. 62–63), VAR
began life as a helpful rule of thumb for asset managers, but as a way of calculating capital charges, it
became a way of exploiting regulatory slack. Because VAR only captures losses within the confidence
interval, expected return for a given capital charge can be maximized by taking on long-tail risk,
which only materializes outside the confidence interval (Haldane 2011, esp charts 3 and 4).
15 This is because other instruments, variants of preferred stock or subordinated debt, could provide
loss absorbency only on a “gone concern” basis; because they were senior to common stock, they
could be written down only after the common had been completely wiped out (Geithner 2014,
138, 550).
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encourage managerial risk-taking. Pushing against regulatory boundaries is
risky. A sole owner, whose investment in the firm was not diversified, would
be less willing to take such risks than managers incentivized per SVM.
We might therefore seize on a policy response of minimizing regulatory slack:
channeling resources toward regulation so as to eliminate gaps and increase
enforcement intensity. But this would overlook the corrosive impact of SVM on
the regulatory design process itself. Firms focused on minimizing their regula-
tory costs can do so not only by exploiting slack within the current regulatory
set-up, but by influencing the production and enforcement of regulation so as
to increase the effective amount of slack. Firms are not just regulatory “price-
takers”; they can try to change regulatory prices. Moreover, as systemically
important firms tend to be large, the resources available to those running the
firm to try to influence regulators are considerable. The constitutional frame-
work partially determines the extent to which firms are able to exert influence of
this sort—encompassing political donations,16 lobbying campaigns, sponsor-
ship of directed research, revolving door employment opportunities for regu-
lators and aggressive legal challenges to regulatory decisions, to name but a few.
Thus the firm has an additional choice when it comes to cost-minimization:
influence. This is borne out by Coates’ (2012) study of political contributions
by public companies: firms in regulated industries spend more on political
contributions than those in other industries, and the size of such contributions,
for regulated firms, is positively correlated with shareholders’ returns.
While it may be impossible to say a priori which of these strategies will be
cost-minimizing for the firm, there are strong reasons for thinking that influ-
ence is often likely to dominate. If the firm invests in innovation, it will then be
exposed to the risk of renegotiation or recalculation by the regulator, whereby
an ex post increase in the level of regulatory tax will reduce the net returns to
shareholders. If the firm cannot be certain ex ante that such renegotiation will
not occur, then it will be hard to price the expected returns to investment in
innovation. Investments in influencing the regulator will be much easier to
price, however, because to the extent to which they are successful, they will
give the firm certainty over the likely regulatory costs ex post. In other words, it
is likely that a firm committed to minimizing its regulatory costs will always
want to pursue a strategy of influencing the regulator. The closer the focus on
cost-minimization, which SVM encourages, the more severe we may expect this
corrosion of regulatory pricing of social cost to become.
16 See Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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To summarize: private law mechanisms for controlling externalities fare
poorly where systemic risk is concerned, because of the propensity of govern-
ments to bail out troubled firms. Regulatory constraints therefore have to carry
extra heavy freight; yet they are systematically corroded by SVM. This poses the
question whether SVM is an appropriate framework for the governance of
systemically important financial firms.
4 . S Y S T E M I C E X T E R N A L I T I E S A N D S H A R E H O L D E R V A L U E
The case for implementation of SVM in corporate governance rests on its utility
in rendering managers accountable to shareholders. For most firms, this case is
very strong. Left to their own devices, managers would likely prefer to run firms
in accordance with their own interests, rather than those of shareholders.
Where the firm’s activities involve potential externalities, it is conventionally
assumed that the costs of these activities are internalized into the firm’s profit
function through the mechanisms described in Section 3. To the extent that
these mechanisms do not function perfectly, the standard view of corporate
governance sees the relationship between externalities and shareholder value as
a trade-off. Tying managerial returns to stock price performance as a means of
controlling managerial agency costs is thought to generate greater value for
shareholders than the collateral increase in externalities. For systemic harms,
given the size of social losses and the weakness of ordinary control mechanisms,
it seems optimistic to assume this condition is met. Nevertheless, an advocate of
SVM might assert that this is an empirical question; without further evidence
no case is made out for relaxing SVM. This section responds by challenging the
“benefit” component of the trade-off: we show that in the presence of systemic
externalities, SVM does not in fact promote the interests of the majority of share-
holders. Rather, SVM tends to harm the interests of both diversified share-
holders and society. As a result, there is a powerful case for the modification
of internal corporate governance arrangements where systemic externalities are
present.
4.1 Maximizing the stock price
A central tenet of modern portfolio theory is that diversification reduces port-
folio risk. By spreading capital across many uncorrelated investments compris-
ing a portfolio, idiosyncratic risks associated with individual investments can be
eliminated at the portfolio level. Investors consequently need only to be com-
pensated for bearing market risk. It has long been understood that
limited liability for shareholders fosters diversification in this way and
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consequently lowers overall risk-bearing costs for firms (Easterbrook & Fischel
1991, pp. 41–44).
One of the most important ideas in modern corporate governance—that it
is desirable to encourage managerial risk-taking—is based on this premise.
Diversified shareholders may be expected to behave, as regards decisions over
idiosyncratic risks, as though they are risk-neutral. Consequently, the stock
price, which reflects their demand function, will respond to changes in the
firm’s expected returns but not to idiosyncratic risks. Individual managers
running firms, however, are likely to have significant amounts of undiversi-
fied human capital tied up in the firm. Thus managers may be expected to
exhibit greater risk aversion than diversified shareholders would prefer.
Negative outcomes may lead to managerial termination (in part because
outsiders’ inability to distinguish between a good bet gone bad and a bad
bet from the outset) or even the firm’s bankruptcy. This creates a problem:
managers may shun higher net present value (NPV) projects because their
returns are more volatile.
Modern thinking on corporate governance focuses on particular mechan-
isms to address the mismatch of risk preferences between diversified share-
holders and managers, with the goal of giving managers incentives not to
pass up positive NPV projects because of risk aversion. The way in which
this is implemented has two aspects. First, managers are given a “carrot” in
the form of equity-linked compensation, especially stock options. Options
increase managers’ returns in good states of the world, but cost them noth-
ing in bad states of the world. They consequently encourage managers to
focus more on good outcomes, and less on bad, thereby reducing risk aver-
sion (Jensen and Murphy 1990). Of course, the lack of diversification means
that it is relatively expensive—in terms of the dollar sums that must be paid
to executives—to overcome risk aversion in this way (Conyon, Core, & Guay
2009).
Second, directors and officers are given a shield from liability for breach of
their duty of care through the “business judgment rule”. This provides that
where a business decision is taken in good faith on the basis of adequate infor-
mation, it will not be open to challenge in a shareholder suit unless the decision
resulted in “waste”—dissipation of corporate assets so egregious that no deci-
sion maker could plausibly have justified it in good faith.17 This provides
downside protection against good bets gone bad. The rationale for the business
judgment rule is frequently stated as being to mitigate the problem of
17 See, e.g. ALI Principles of Corporate Governance, § 4.01. The rule is sometimes styled as a “pre-
sumption” that directors have met their burden of good faith and due inquiry unless plaintiff can
show evidence to the contrary.
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managerial risk-aversion we have just described, framed in terms of the interests
of diversified shareholder.
Chancellor Allen explained the rationale as follows in the Delaware case of
Gagliardi v. Trifoods International, Inc.:18
“Shareholders don’t want (or shouldn’t rationally want) directors to
be risk averse. Shareholders’ investment interests, across the full
range of their diversifiable equity investments, will be maximized if
corporate directors and managers honestly assess risk and reward and
accept for the corporation the highest risk adjusted returns available
that are above the firm’s cost of capital . . . . But directors will tend to
deviate from this rational acceptance of corporate risk if in
authorizing the corporation to undertake a risky investment, the
directors must assume some degree of personal risk relating to ex
post facto claims of derivative liability for any resulting corporate
loss.”
Judge Winter also sounded this theme as well in the well-known US Court of
Appeals case, Joy v. North:19
“[B]ecause potential profit often corresponds to the potential risk, it is
very much in the interest of shareholders that the law not create
incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions. Some opportunities
offer great profits at the risk of very substantial losses, while the
alternatives offer less risk of loss but also less potential profit.
Shareholders can reduce the volatility of risk by diversifying their
holdings. In the case of the diversified shareholder, the seemingly more
risky alternatives may well be the best choice since great losses in some
stocks will over time be offset by even greater gains in others. Given
mutual funds and similar forms of diversified investment, courts need
not bend over backwards to give special protection to shareholders
who refuse to reduce the volatility of risk by not diversifying. A rule
which penalizes the choice of seemingly riskier alternatives thus may
not be in the interest of shareholders generally.”
The point of the business judgment rule is not to sanction negligence. Rather,
the rule is premised on the view that the encouragement of business risk-taking
requires acceptance of the inevitability of business failures and that a liability
18 683 A. 2d 1049 at 1052-3 (Del. Ch. 1996).
19 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert den. 460 U.S. 1051 (1983) (footnotes omitted). It is note-
worthy that Chancellor Allen explicitly embraced this understanding of the basis for the business
judgment rule. See In re Caremark Int’l Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 n. 16 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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rule premised on negligence will result in hindsight bias determinations of
negligence. Thus as Chancellor Allen concludes in Gagliardi:
“If . . . corporate directors were to be found liable for a corporate loss
from a risky project on the ground that the investment was too risky
(foolishly risky! stupidly risky! egregiously risky!—you supply the
adverb), their liability would be joint and several for the whole loss
(with I suppose a right of contribution). Given the scale of operation
of modern public corporations, this stupefying disjunction between
risk and reward for corporate directors threatens undesirable effects.
Given this disjunction, only a very small probability of director liability
based on “negligence”, “inattention”, “waste”, etc., could induce a
board to avoid authorizing risky investment projects to any extent!
Obviously, it is in the shareholders’ economic interest to offer
sufficient protection to directors from liability for negligence, etc., to
allow directors to conclude that, as a practical matter, there is no risk
that, if they act in good faith and meet minimal proceduralist
standards of attention, they can face liability as a result of a business
loss.”20
In sum, the structure of corporate governance arrangements, at least in the
USA, is explicitly directed towards encouraging managers to undertake the
highest-NPV projects available to them, regardless of their level of risk. More
specifically, the use of options as a “carrot” coupled with the absence of any
liability “stick” encourages managers to focus on activities that will increase the
stock price over the time horizon of their option.
4.2 Market Risk
The foregoing framework assumes that the risks related to particular projects
among which managers choose are idiosyncratic (Easterbrook & Fischel 1991,
p. 99). This assumption is invalid, however, if some projects have the potential
to contribute to market risk. “Market risk” is the component of portfolio risk
which cannot be avoided by diversification (Brealey et al. 2011, p. 156). We
normally assume that while individual firms’ returns are affected by market risk,
the success or failure of their projects does not have any impact on the
aggregate market risk. In other words, market risk reflects exogenous
macroeconomic volatility, which affects firms, but not vice versa. The intuition
behind this is that if a project (or firm) fails, this will only affect that firm, or at
20 683 A.2d at 1052-53. Similar thinking grounded the adoption in Delaware and elsewhere of per-
missive exculpation statutes (e.g. Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 102(b)(7)) for breach of the duty of care
following Smith v. Van Gorkom 488 A. 2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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worst, a few others sufficiently proximate to the activity in question to suffer
loss. Indeed, the failure of one firm may strengthen the market position of
rivals.
However, if a bad state realization causes sufficiently widespread losses to
other firms, then it is better understood as affecting market risk.
Consequently investors will be unable to diversify this away. The financial
sector provides an intuitive example. The closure, even temporarily, of a
bank involved in the payments system would lead to widespread social
costs being borne by other users of the payments system.21 Such costs
would be felt by firms generally, and hence increasing the risk of an indi-
vidual bank’s failure will impose expected costs on other firms generally, and
likely increase the volatility of their returns. Thus activities that increase the
risk of bank failure would both lower expected returns and increase volatility
for the market as a whole.
The consequence of this is to damage the interests of a diversified shareholder
in two ways. First, genuinely systemic harm will reduce expected returns across
such a wide cross-section of firms as to undermine diversification.22 Second, the
additional market risk will increase the expected premium required to com-
pensate for such risk. The combined effect will be to reduce stock prices
throughout the diversified portfolio and to impose losses on diversified share-
holders that far exceed the losses on the failed bank. Critically, the expected
single-firm gains associated with ratcheting up the risk-taking by the bank will
be swamped by the expected increase in portfolio-wide losses that such risk-
taking would entail.
The consequences of an exclusive focus on SVM in a systemically important
firm can be illustrated with a simple numerical example. The example illustrates
the conflict of interest between a manager (or other controller) with incentives
to maximize the share price and the diversified shareholders. Take the case of a
systemically important firm (“Bank”) with an equity value of $1 million,
divided between a Manager (M) holding $500,000 in equity and Diversified
Shareholders (DS) holding $500,000. DS also hold $100 million of equity in a
portfolio of other firms. Assume M can cause Bank to pursue a risky strategy.
This has a 90 percent chance of success, in which case it yields a payoff of
$333,000, but carries a 10 percent chance of causing the Bank’s failure, with a
21 For example, the UK’s Royal Bank of Scotland suffered a software malfunction which caused its
payments processing to shut down transactions for over 17 million accounts for three days in June
2012 (Masters, Moore, & Pickard. 2012).
22 To be sure, some firms will do better as consumers substitute into cheaper goods, but the economic
contraction will produce many more losers than winners.
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loss of the entire equity value.23 The expected within-firm payoff from this
strategy to Bank’s shareholders as a group is $200,000.24
Now let’s see how systemic risk drives a wedge between M and DS. The
project’s expected return to M is $100,000, reflecting her 50 per cent ownership
of Bank. But DS, unlike M, hold shares in other firms. Assume now that if Bank
fails, it triggers a systemic shock that causes a general decline in market values of
10 percent. DS, unlike M, will bear losses associated with that systemic effect.
The expected return for DS from M’s pursuit of the risky strategy is thus
$900,000, aggregating expected gains of $100,000 on their investment in
Bank, and expected losses of $1,000,000 on their diversified portfolio.25
The example shows that expected gains from M’s single-minded focus effort
to maximize the value of Bank’s stock can be swamped, from the perspective of
DS, by a systemic effect of the Bank’s failure. The example makes simplifying
assumptions, of course, but without loss of generality: if additional expected
returns from risk-taking are high enough, managers (or other controllers) will
find it rational to pursue risk-taking that diversified shareholders would find
irrational.26 Compensation mechanisms that governance theory has generally
embraced—high-powered incentives to overcome managerial risk-aversion,
payoff structures that strip out the effects of market risk—exacerbate the con-
flict between managers and shareholders in the systemically important financial
firm.
A focus on Bank’s stock price alone will not take expected systemic costs of its
activities into account. If Bank’s activities increase its cashflows, its stock price
will rise regardless of the costs these activities may impose on DS. If DS hold
stock in Bank, their expected return is $900,000. If they forego the opportun-
ity to hold this stock, their expected return is $1 million. DS are better off
holding stock in Bank than not doing so. If DS hold no stock in Bank, they face
the downside of potential systemic distress costs but none of the benefit of
successful risk taking. Consequently, we would expect Bank’s stock price to
rise even as it embarks on systemic risk-taking. Stock prices impound own-
firm expected returns from increased risk-taking, but not the potential harms to
23 Since our point is to focus on the conflict within shareholder groups, we ignore possible creditor
losses.
24 The arithmetic: (0.9 333,000) + (0.11,000,000)¼ 200,000.
25 The arithmetic: (0.5 200,000) (0.1 0.1(100,000,000)¼$900,000.
26 Our numerical example does not take into account the effect of managerial risk aversion, which
would cause M to discount expected returns from a risky project. But this simply increases the size of
the expected return necessary to induce M to pursue the risky project. Managerial risk-aversion may
produce more selective risk-taking but it does not address the fundamental wedge between the
own-firm payoffs to managers and portfolio pay-offs to diversified shareholders.
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other firms. Thus for systemically important firms, encouraging managers to
take more risks achieves precisely the opposite result to that which is ordinarily
desirable.
Another way to frame the point is this: for the typical non-financial firm, the
concept of “excessive” risk-taking has little meaning from the shareholder per-
spective. So long as the firm is taking its highest-NPV projects, diversified
shareholders (or shareholders who could be diversified) should be satisfied,
even if the firm is not successful. The portfolio of firms following such a strategy
should outperform a portfolio of “safer” firms. For systemically important fi-
nancial firms, the matter is quite different. To be sure, risk-taking is inevitable,
but “excessive” risk-taking is meaningful and objectionable, from the diversi-
fied shareholder perspective. This is because the failure of a systemically im-
portant firm produces losses across the portfolio.
So, where systemic harms are concerned, diversified shareholders may prefer
that the bank pursue more conservative projects, while managers with high-
powered incentives (or undiversified controllers) would prefer the bank pursue
more risky projects. Startlingly, this result is an outright reversal of the ordinary
framework for corporate governance. Diversified shareholders, instead of want-
ing managers to take more risk than the latter are wont to do, actually want
them to take less risk.
These theoretical claims are consistent with empirical research associating
greater risk-taking prior to the financial crisis with the existence of a controlling
shareholder (Laeven & Levine 2009; Beltratti & Stulz 2012, pp. 14–15), and
more intense CEO incentives to increase stock price with greater bank losses
during the financial crisis (Fahlenbrach & Stulz 2011, pp. 18–20). The literature
also reports a link between weak managerial insulation from shareholders with
losses during the financial crisis (Beltratti & Stulz 2012, pp. 10–13; Ferreira et al.
2013). This is also consistent with our theory if, as seems plausible, weak man-
agerial insulation disproportionately empowers concentrated shareholders,
who face lower coordination costs.27
5 . W H A T A B O U T N O N F I N A N C I A L F I R M S ?
Our discussion has focused on the financial sector. Other scholars have argued
that SVM gives rise to more widespread problems (e.g. Stout 2012; Mayer
2013). In this section, we ask whether the problem we identify generalizes to
nonfinancial firms. In the presence of effective external mechanisms for inter-
nalizing social costs, SVM functions virtuously to promote the interests of
27 See infra, Section 6.2.
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society. Where these external mechanisms do not function well, then the social
utility of SVM becomes harder to determine a priori. It depends on the relative
size of the benefits of controlling within-firm agency costs and the costs of
externalities. Yet where the externalities are systemic in character, then this
tradeoff disappears: SVM no longer benefits diversified shareholders, and so
is a priori problematic.
On our analysis, systemic externalities arise where a firm’s activities create a
risk of very large losses that are widely distributed throughout the economy and
of which a large component is indirect.28 A widespread impact—affecting many
different parties—makes Coasean contracting hard to implement, and indirect
losses are not well catered to by the law of torts. Consequently regulatory
mechanisms are used to deter excessive risk taking and the imposition of prob-
abilistic social harm, the efficacy of which is undermined by SVM. Very large,
widely distributed losses are likely to have an adverse impact on diversified
shareholders’ portfolios.
One can easily think of harms matching these criteria that might be caused by
nonfinancial firms. Emissions from a nuclear plant or a deep-sea oil well are two
plausible examples. There are, however, important differences between these
cases and systemic financial firms. First, tort law does do significant work to
internalize social costs where there is some component of direct harm.29 And
any harm that is sufficiently widespread as to be spoken of as “systemic”, but
which involves a component of direct harm, will trigger a very large aggregate
liability. Second, for nonfinancial systemic harms, the bankruptcy of the firm
would not trigger the systemic loss: given the existence of some element of
direct harm, the direction of causality is likely to run the other way. These
elements suggest that private law liability has a meaningful role to play in
relation to nonfinancial systemic harms.
A third difference concerns the role of government. Where the harm in
question is systemic, it will be large enough to have political implications.
We may expect government to mobilize to remedy the problem. If the harm
is caused by the bankruptcy of the firm, as with financial firms, this mobiliza-
tion will consist of actions designed to avoid bankruptcy from occurring: bail-
outs. But if the harm has been caused by a firm that is not bankrupt, then the
mobilization may be expected to include actions that threaten to bankrupt the
firm. For example, following BP’s Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of
28 Activities that generate such externalities with high probability are unlikely to be tolerated at all;
consequently we are concerned with activities that generate risks of such externalities, where the
degree of risk is a function of the way in which the activity is performed.
29 One type of nonfinancial activity that could give rise to purely economic losses would be the
production of dysfunctional software.
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Mexico, the US government let it be known that the firm might not expect to
continue to hold licenses to drill in US territory in the future. It seems highly
likely that this was the concern that lead BP to accede to the US government’s
“request” that it “voluntarily” set up a trust fund to compensate all victims for
all losses, economic or otherwise. BP’s Annual Report for 2013 recognized total
charges of $42.7bn for costs to the firm associated with the disaster (BP plc
2014, p. 40). These two types of government intervention have opposite effects
on incentives. Bail-outs reduce the effective liability borne by shareholders,
whereas license removal threats raise the effective liability to the value of the
firm’s operations in the jurisdiction.
In sum, whilst a case can be made that SVM tends to exacerbate externalities
in nonfinancial firms, the implications depend on careful scrutiny of relative
costs and benefits. In this respect, financial firms really are different. The causal
link between bankruptcy and systemic harm, and the perverse incentives cre-
ated by government bail-outs, mean that an a priori case for relaxing SVM can
be made.
6 . C O R P O R A T E G O V E R N A N C E S O L U T I O N S
In the absence of effective constraints on the internalization of social costs by
financial firms, the interests of diversified shareholders and controllers (man-
agers and concentrated owners) diverge over the appropriate level of risk-taking
for activities capable of giving rise to systemic harms. Encouraging managers to
focus on SVM will consequently result in excessive risk-taking not only from
the standpoint of third parties, but also as regards the interests of diversified
shareholders. Relaxing SVM in such circumstances does not engender the con-
flict between agency costs and externalities its defenders normally identify. We
should make clear that we do not advocate the abandonment of all account-
ability of managers to shareholders. We say nothing about appointment and
voting rights, for example. Rather, we seek to identify discrete changes to the
existing corporate governance framework which are calculated to reduce the
intensity with which managers focus on the stock price. In this section, we
canvass ways in which this might be done.
6.1 Regulation of Executive Pay?
A relaxation of SVM for systemically important financial firms has already
begun to happen through regulatory initiatives in relation to executive pay. A
range of policy proposals have sought to modify executive compensation in
financial institutions so as ameliorate incentives (e.g. Bebchuk & Spamann
2009; Bhagat & Romano 2009). Ideas of this type have been taken up by
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regulators around the world: in April 2009, G20 representatives agreed to a set
of guidelines detailing how national financial regulators should align perform-
ance-related pay with the long term and risk-adjusted performance of financial
firms (Financial Stability Forum 2009). A key component is to restrict man-
agers’ ability to cash out equity-linked compensation in the short run, effect-
ively forcing managers to post this as a bond for continued good performance.
The European Union has gone further in seeking to weaken managerial incen-
tives to increase shareholder value, by imposing a cap on the ratio of variable to
fixed executive compensation.30
We do not doubt that changes to executive pay have the potential to reduce
systemic externalities, and we support the general thrust of these reforms. But
we are skeptical whether, by themselves, they are enough. The rules impose the
same model on all applicable firms, which is problematic if—as seems likely—
firms vary as regards which governance structures are appropriate.31 At the
same time, if regulators do not understand the workings of financial firms as
well as insiders—also plausible—incompleteness in the specification of the rules
seems likely, giving rise to regulatory slack and opportunities for arbitrage.
A straightforward proposal such as to tie managerial pay to bond performance
as well as stock performance, for example, runs into the immediate problem
that in ordinary times bond values are much more influenced by market-wide
interest rate changes than own-firm credit risk changes, and that an already-
fragile alternative measure of single-firm credit risk, credit default swap spreads,
will be undercut by use as a regulatory device (Lucas 1976). While in the short
run public outcry may be enough to secure the implementation of some head-
line rules, we may expect their application to be systematically weakened over
time through concerted influence by the regulated firms (Culpepper 2010;
Coffee 2012).
These limitations can readily be illustrated by the implementation of regu-
latory prescriptions regarding compensation practices. The G20 Principles, for
example, require performance-related pay to vary with ex post realizations of
risk outcomes, over a sufficiently long period of time. In relation to senior
executives, this takes the form of a requirement that 40–60 percent of variable
pay be deferred for a period of at least three years (Financial Stability Board
2009, p. 3). It is unclear what magic lies in these particular numbers. And
consistently with our observations about regulatory influence, the rules
30 CRD IV, Art 94. Murphy (2013) argues the EU rule will have the unintended consequence of actually
increasing incentives for risk-taking.
31 Indeed, it may be that incentives facing employees below senior ranks are crucial (Acharya, Litov, &
Sepe 2013).
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applying these guidelines in the USA have been held up by industry lobbying
and inter-agency wrangling such that no effective changes have yet been im-
plemented.32 Similarly, media reports suggest the EU bonus cap rules are being
circumvented by firms paying “allowances” that the rules class as “fixed” com-
pensation but which are in fact variable (Schäfer & Arnold, 2014).
6.2 Shareholder Democracy?
Some might say the clash of shareholder interests in relation to systemic harms
points to a straightforward governance solution: since diversified shareholders
typically constitute the majoritarian owners of the firms in question, should
shareholder democracy not produce checks on excessive risk-taking by man-
agers? In this regard, the “re-concentration” of diffuse share ownership into the
hands of institutional investors should increase the potency of shareholder
voice (Black 1992; Gilson & Gordon 2013), and the recent adoption of man-
datory “say on pay” by the Dodd-Frank Act should offer a ready-made channel
for the exertion of influence.33 Thinking of this sort also underpinned the UK’s
Walker Review, which recommended facilitating increased shareholder over-
sight for financial institutions (Walker 2009, pp. 82–87).
Although superficially promising, a strategy of governance reform through
shareholder self-help at the firm level is unlikely to be sufficient to check ex-
cessive risk-taking by systemic firms. First, diversified shareholders typically
hold their shares through institutional investor intermediaries, whose govern-
ance activism will be constrained by what one of us has termed the “agency
costs of agency capitalism” (Gilson & Gordon 2013). This refers to self-inter-
ested behavior by intermediaries who are typically evaluated by relative, rather
than absolute, performance. Such intermediaries ordinarily have little incentive
to intervene in the governance of portfolio firms, because to do so would incur
private costs yet confer a benefit on their investment management competitors
who also hold the same stock—a classic free-rider problem. While intermedi-
aries cannot avoid the systemic risk associated with a financial firm simply by
selling the shares in question (unlike in the case of an under-performing nonfi-
nancial firm), relative performance evaluation still creates a collective action
problem. Systemic risks will harm their competitors’ portfolios as well as their
own, and so intermediaries’ incentives to intervene will be muted. Indeed, as we
32 Dodd-Frank Act § 956; US Treasury Department et al, “Incentive-Based Compensation
Arrangements; Proposed Rule”, 76 Fed Reg 21169 (2011). These proposals rely heavily on compen-
sation deferral strategies whose actual effects, as Jackson & Honigsberg (2014) point out, may be
highly sensitive to contractual detail.
33 Dodd-Frank Act § 951, 124 Stat. 1375, 1899 (2010) codified as Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
14A.
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argue above, intermediaries will face incentives to bid up the shares of risk-
taking financial firms.34
Second, the structure of governance activism almost invariably produces
pressure for improved stock price performance at the governance target.35
Much firm-specific governance energy comes from blockholders with large
enough stakes to justify independent activism that may mobilize a latent ma-
jority (Kahan & Rock 2007). But blockholders, who reduce diversification in the
assembly of their block, generally focus attention on maximizing the share price
of the particular firm, prodding management in that direction (Brav et al. 2008;
Bebchuk, Brav, & Jiang 2014). This is how the blockholder earns returns from
its activism and achieves compensation for bearing undiversified risk.
Ordinarily, in the case of nonfinancial firms, blockholder interests are aligned
with the diversified shareholders. In the case of systemic financial firms, how-
ever, the antagonism of interests means that what is ordinarily virtuous may
become a vice for diversified shareholders.
That said, there may be grounds for institutional investors to influence gov-
ernance in systemic firms through political, rather than firm-level, channels
(Black 1992; Armour 2009). Coordination through institutional investors’ as-
sociations can lower the costs of collective action in the political arena. Such
associations may be capable of forming a useful counterweight to financial
sector lobbying, although evidence of collective asset manager lobbying in
favor of more stringent systemic risk controls in the post-financial crisis
period has so far been scant.
6.3 Liability Rules
In light of our hesitancy regarding the success of either or both of the foregoing
mechanisms—compensation constraints and revived shareholder democracy–it
is desirable to consider others. A third possibility would be personal liability for
those who control and monitor the strategy of systemically important firms.
This is the inverse of regulating executive pay: rather than reducing the size of
the “carrot”, it introduces a “stick” to generate countervailing incentives.
Liability of this sort could complement other measures by adding three distinct
and beneficial features.
34 See supra text accompanying note 27.
35 Indeed, this seems to be the early pattern in shareholder voting on “say on pay”. Thomas, Palmiter,
& Cotter (2012) suggest that the results of the first year suggest most management pay proposals pass
easily except at poorly performing companies, and Cuñat, Giné, & Guadelupe (2013) report an
increase in share price performance triggered by voluntary adoption of a “say on pay” mechanism in
the years immediately before the provision became mandatory.
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First, and unlike rules about executive pay, liability rules would create a role
for court-developed standards in the governance of such firms. Liability stand-
ards avoid the problems described in Section 3.3, which undermine regulatory
rules. Because compliance with standards is fleshed out ex post by courts, prob-
lems of arbitrage can be mitigated.
Second, judicially crafted standards are less open to subversion by industry
influence than regulatory prescriptions. Judges can only propound new prece-
dents in light of cases brought before them; combined with standing rules this
provides some sort of check on the extent to which a judicial standard can be
subverted by lobbying. This is not to say that litigation is immune from industry
influence; rather, that it is relatively robust.
Third, because enforcement is in the hands of private plaintiffs, rather than
regulators, opportunities for lobbying to undermine its efficacy are much
reduced. Private plaintiffs in shareholder litigation are widely dispersed, and
so more difficult for lobbyists to reach than centralized regulators. Moreover,
private plaintiffs—and their lawyers—have much more direct incentives to
trigger enforcement than public agencies, because they keep the rewards of
successful litigation (Hay & Shleifer 1998).
To be sure, judges—even those who specialize in corporate law—probably
lack expertise when it comes to systemic risk, as compared with regulators.
Hence we do not propose replacing regulatory controls with judicial ones.
Rather, we suggest liability rules as an additional mechanism to relax SVM in
systemic firms. To the extent that regulatory interventions to control systemic
risk are successful, there should be little cause for ex post liability. And to the
extent that regulators’ ability to exert such control is undermined, inexpert
judicial control will be the only variety available. Judicial control may be less
precise than regulators, but it is more robust to lobbying. Our claim is that
judicially crafted liability rules could usefully complement the regulatory
changes already being implemented.
Director liability is not an innovation in the control of risk-taking by
financial institutions; rather, it has a long history in helping to overcome
the characteristic fragility of banks and the contagion risks from single bank
failure. Until federal deposit insurance became entrenched as a stability-pro-
vider, US bank directors faced liability to creditors (particularly depositors)
in insolvency under the so-called “trust fund” doctrine. In the well-
known 1940 decision of Litwin v. Allen, the New York Supreme Court
held that:
“[D]irectors are liable for negligence in the performance of their
duties. Not being insurers, directors are not liable for errors of
judgment or for mistakes while acting with reasonable skill and
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prudence . . . . Undoubtedly, a director of a bank is held to stricter
accountability than the director of an ordinary business corporation. A
director of a bank is entrusted with the funds of depositors, and the
stockholders look to him for protection from the imposition of personal
liability.”36 (emphasis added).
The 1880 New York Court of Appeals case Hun v. Cary,37 which held bank
directors liable on a negligence standard, focused on the particular vulnerability
of bank depositors:
“[T]he degree of care required depends upon the subjects to which it is
to be supplied . . . . What would be slight neglect in the care exercised
in the affairs of a turnpike corporation, or even of a manufacturing
corporation, might be gross neglect in care exercised in the manage-
ment of a savings bank entrusted with the savings of a multitude of
poor people, depending for its life upon credit and liable to be wrecked
by a breath of suspicion.”38 (emphasis added).
The stability-enhancing mechanism of common law bank-director liability
faded in importance after the adoption of the Federal Deposit Insurance of
1933. A state law retreat on negligence liability followed, sometimes through
explicitly targeted protection for bank officers and directors;39 in other cases as
part of an omnibus retreat on director liability for breaches of the duty of care.40
In the case of Delaware, most notably, bank directors were the inadvertent
beneficiaries of the statutory liability opt-out adopted after Smith v. Van
Gorkom.41
36 Litwin v. Allen 25 NYS 2d 667, 678 (NY Sup.1940).
37 Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (NY 1880).
38 82 N.Y. at 71 (citation omitted). Former Delaware Supreme Court Justice Henry Ridgely Horsey
traces the notion of corporate directors’ duty of care to English trust and agency law from the 18th
century, but argues that, while this fiduciary duty was accepted in the USA by the 19th century, the
duty was actually confined to directors of banks and other financial institutions (Horsey 1994).
39 E.g. for Florida, with a large number of bank failures, see FDIC v. Stahl, 89 F.3d 1510, 1516-18 (11th
Cir. 1996) followed by the enactment of Fla. Stat. § 607.0830.
40 See, e.g. Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 102(b)(7), adopted in 1986; Model Bus. Corp Act § 2.02 (b)(4),
adopted in 1990.
41 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (liability for gross negligence imposed on directors
of a non-financial corporation). Our examination of the legislative history of DGCL § 102(b)(7) has
not unearthed any evidence that the position of bank directors was ever considered in the process
leading up to this change. Nevertheless the statute, generally applicable to all Delaware stock cor-
porations, proved capacious enough to provide bank directors a liability shield and the Delaware
courts have not scrutinized the matter further. See In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative
Litigation, 964 A.2d. 106, 124–125 (Del. Ch. 2009).
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Here is the point: we have come to realize that the FDIC’s capacity to
protect against systemic risk from bank failure runs out in the case of a very
large financial firm. In the mid-20th century deposit insurance offered suf-
ficient stability because of the diffuse structure of the banking system and the
deposit-like nature of most banking liabilities. Today, much greater concen-
tration in banking and a shift in the nature of financial-institution liabilities
means that the failure of a large financial firm may harm not only the
shareholders and creditors of the particular firm but also other firms and
the financial system more generally. This revives the case for director-
negligence liability as a method of constraining bank risk-taking, not limited
to cases of bank failure but rather addressed to cases in which a large finan-
cial institution suffers losses of a magnitude and kind that could threaten the
institution’s stability.
We sketch what such a liability regime might look like in Section 7.
7 . R I S K O V E R S I G H T L I A B I L I T Y I N S Y S T E M I C F I R M S
Our proposal, in brief, is as follows. First, a review framework in which
managers have a duty to address the conflicts of interest embedded in high-
powered performance incentives through obtaining board-level review of
risk-taking that may give rise to systemic harms, effectuated through a
risk-committee process, akin to a “special committee” process in other
areas of significant conflict. Second, an oversight framework in which the
board has oversight responsibility for the level of risk-taking by the firm,
including risk-taking in operations as well as strategy, not just its compli-
ance with applicable legal norms. Third, a standard of liability that is neg-
ligence-based, because the risk-neutral heuristic associated with the business
judgment rule is inappropriate where systemic risks are concerned. We refer
in the discussion to aspects of Delaware law in order to illustrate how
judge-made law could accommodate this type of mechanism, but the
framework could also be implemented by Federal courts, as we explain in
section 7.7.
The goal of such a reform is deterrence: to induce board “ownership” of the
firm’s risk, so that the board will take charge of understanding the level of risk-
taking, and, where necessary, curb it. This is what “risk oversight” means. On
our analysis, “excessive” risk-taking is a meaningful conception in the case of a
systemically important financial firm. The challenge is to operationalize the
concept. Board-level accountability is an important element in establishing
and adhering to appropriate risk parameters.
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7.1 Which Defendants?
We focus attention on those controlling a corporation, because of the diver-
gence between the interests of controllers and diversified shareholders in the
case of systemic externalities. As such our proposal differs from much earlier
work on corporate externalities—and indeed other work on corporate govern-
ance and banking—which focuses on potential liability of shareholders
(Hansmann & Kraakman 1991; Macey & Miller 1992).
It is helpful to reflect on the classes of person involved in corporate govern-
ance. Officers are executives, tasked with making decisions about the running of
the company. They consequently have the power to initiate corporate decision-
making. They also typically face high-powered incentives derived from variable
compensation determined by reference to the share price. Directors, in contrast,
are tasked with acting as monitors of the performance of the officers. Their
engagement generally takes the form of veto rights, through board decision-
making on proposals initiated by executives; monitoring of performance re-
porting, and oversight of compensation and retention-decisions for senior
managers. Although the directors’ pay may include some stock-based compen-
sation, the overall package is not high-powered like managers’. Their incentives
are comparatively low-powered, driven by personal integrity and reputational
concerns (Kraakman et al 2009, p. 43). Directors may also be officers, although
in recent years the roles have become increasingly specialized, with the typical
corporate board containing only one officer, the CEO (Gordon 2007, p. 1476).
The position of controlling shareholders also deserves attention. We take
“controlling” to mean having enough voting power to steer the outcome of a
shareholder vote. While such persons do not enjoy formal day-to-day control
rights, they do control the identity of the board, and through them, the execu-
tives. As a result they will enjoy informal veto rights over many decisions
(Shleifer & Vishny 1997, pp. 754–755). They will be motivated by high-powered
incentives stemming from their share ownership stake.42 Although the law
establishes various presumptive thresholds for “control”, whether a particular
firm has a controlling shareholder often turns on questions of fact.43
These categories of person between them face two different types of govern-
ance problem, which in turn track two different types of liability standard. On
the one hand, officers with equity pay and controlling shareholders may face a
conflict of interest as regards systemic externalities. Their personal financial
42 These incentives may be attenuated by “private benefits” derived from control of the firm, to the
extent that they do not move in tandem with the stock price.
43 See e.g. Bank Holding Company Act, §§ 2 (A),(C); 3 (25% voting power of “any class of voting
securities” gives control; owner of less than 5% presumptively does not have control), codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1841(a).
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interest lies in maximizing the stock price. Yet where systemic externalities are
concerned, share price maximization is not in diversified shareholders’ inter-
ests. Consequently risk appetite in systemic firms can be seen as a duty of loyalty
problem, akin to other conflicts of interest between controllers and diversified
shareholders.
On the other hand, directors do not face direct financial conflicts. Rather, they
face more genteel pressures of camaraderie and community between themselves
and officers, which may have a subtly corrosive effect on their ability to monitor
and exert oversight. Moreover, where controlling shareholders are in place, or
where executives have de facto control of the directorial nomination process,
then the directors will be pre-selected as individuals willing to toe the line in
accordance with the wishes of the firm’s real controller. Even absent these
handicaps, directors lack strong incentives to take adequate care in the oversight
of the decisions of executives. Because directors’ incentives are not direct fi-
nancial ones, the obligation they face is best characterized as one of due care.44
7.2 Risk-Taking and the Duty of Loyalty
In corporations, conflicts of interest are acceptable on the part of those running
the company provided that appropriate procedural and substantive safeguards
are met. The key procedural safeguards are 2-fold: first, full disclosure about the
conflicted transaction by the insiders and second, approval by the independent
directors or an independent board committee, tasked with determining
whether the proposed transaction serves the interests of the unaffiliated share-
holders. The greater the conflict, the more onerous the job of the independents,
and the more carefully the court will examine the process and the outcome.45
For activities that could engender systemic externalities, controllers may
prefer more of the activity to be undertaken, or with less precaution, than
diversified shareholders. Consequently decisions relating to such activities
may deserve to be treated like other conflicts of interest. This should entail
44 This is reflected in the focus on direct financial interest in determining whether a director is “dis-
interested” for purposes of invoking the business judgment rule (Gordon 2007, pp. 1482–1484).
45 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (special litigation committee reviewing de-
rivative action); Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys.,
Inc., 638 A.2d 1115 (1994) (parent-subsidiary mergers). Cf. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d
635 (Del. 2014) (procedural safeguards that achieve near-functional equivalence to arm’s length
bargaining may call for business judgment review even in parent-subsidiary merger). However, in
cases where controlling shareholders are not on both sides, Delaware courts defer to independent
directors’ business judgment, see Teachers’ Retirement Sys. of La. v. Aidinoff, 900 A.2d 654, 669-70
(Del. Ch. 2006).
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both full disclosure by the managers of the risks and genuine review by an
independent risk committee of the board. Should risk-taking lead to a loss to
the firm, then the court should be willing to consider the independence and
diligence of the risk committee’s review of the challenged strategy. The conse-
quence of inadequate disclosure about the strategy or the committee’s failure to
conduct an adequate review should be a standard remedy for “unsanitized”
conflicted transactions: disgorgement of gains made through the conflict. For
management, this would encompass equity-based pay; for controlling share-
holders, it would comprise dividends or capital gains, in each case to the extent
their value was enhanced by the risk-taking strategy. The regime thereby creates
a powerful incentive for managers (and controlling shareholders) to take risk
management seriously. It also gives a deterrent incentive that is precisely cor-
related with the size of the conflict of interest.
7.3 Risk-Taking and Duties of Care
Turning now to directors: they will not themselves be responsible for the op-
erational decisions that trigger excessive levels of risk. Rather, their role will be
in high-level oversight of the firm’s operations; appointing managers and set-
ting incentive arrangements; review and approval of strategy. Consequently the
relevant category of liability would most likely be for what has come to be
known as “oversight”. Here liability is imposed not for having made inappro-
priate decisions regarding risk-taking, but rather for having delegated these
decisions to others and failed to oversee their decision-making. In the well-
known Caremark decision, Chancellor Allen remarked that directors have a
continuing duty to ensure that “monitoring systems are in place”.46
However, the duty articulated in Caremark has been taken to apply only in a
very limited way. It is framed in subjective terms: the board are under an
obligation to make no more than a “good faith attempt” to ensure that a
monitoring system is in place, and only face liability if they have “utterly failed”
to implement oversight, or “consciously failed” to monitor activity.47
Moreover, it has been understood solely in terms of the monitoring of activities
that might lead to a breach of applicable statutory or regulatory standards,48
and does not extend to oversight of the firm’s business strategy.49 In any event,
46 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
47 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. Sup. 2006).
48 Although arguably Chancellor Allen originally envisaged a wider scope than this. See Caremark,
supra note 40, at 969–970.
49 In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
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state law attempts to articulate a more onerous liability standard would be
thwarted by statutory provision for exculpation of directors from liability for
breach of duty of care.50
Framing monitoring obligations as parasitic upon corporate regulatory ob-
ligations is in keeping with the standard account of how corporate externalities
are controlled. If corporate regulatory obligations were set so as to internalize
social costs, then tasking the board to monitor compliance would encourage
activity that should increase the probability of compliance (Arlen & Kraakman
1997). And by cabining the board’s particularized monitoring responsibility to
the domain of regulatory compliance, the Caremark duty seeks to preserve the
traditional business judgment rule. This framing assumes regulatory obligations
are set appropriately to internalize social costs; and second, that the business
judgment rule rests on a sound policy basis. Neither is valid where systemic risks
are concerned.
Consequently, it is desirable for a duty to monitor to be applied in wider
circumstances and to a higher standard.51 The obligation could be framed as
being to oversee systems to assess potential downside consequences of the
firm’s business strategies—that is, its “risks”—including operational and
other risks to execution of those strategies within pre-determined risk-par-
ameters, and to factor these into its decision making.52 The scope should be
independent of regulatory norms to which the firm might otherwise be
subject. This tells boards that compliance with regulation is not necessarily
enough to ensure freedom from potential liability. Such a stance is desirable
if there may be regulatory slack. It reserves to the courts power to assess ex
post whether or not risk-oversight systems were adequate, regardless of the
level of regulatory compliance. To make such an exercise meaningful, it
would need to be coupled with negligence-based liability for directors, be-
cause a knowledge-based standard would exonerate directors who kept their
heads in the sand. Implementation would thus necessitate a Federal liability
regime, or assurance that banks and other systemically important financial
firms do not take advantage of exculpation provisions such as Delaware’s
section 102(b)(7).
Diverse matters could test whether the board brought appropriate risk man-
agement oversight to bear. Examples drawn from recent events would include
50 Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 102(b)(7).
51 In our view, the opinion in Citigroup (supra note 43) was a missed opportunity to do this.
52 The “enterprise risk management” literature sometimes distinguishes between the board’s
monitoring of the firm’s “risk appetite” vs. “risk control systems,” (Tarullo 2014), and other-
wise subdivides the strategic vs. operational elements of risk management (Wilson 2013; Davies
2013).
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large-scale trading losses, improvident mergers and acquisition activity, fund-
ing strategies that expose the firm to excessive run-risk, victimization of the
firm by customer fraud, and loose internal controls that permit risk-taking
beyond agreed upon risk limits. Financial firms are in the business of risk-
taking (Tarullo 2014). In bringing risk management oversight to bear, it is
surely the board’s responsibility to identify those risks which are of a magnitude
and kind as to threaten the firm’s stability. Engaging seriously in oversight of all
these dimensions would also tend to challenge the notion that independent
directors should not be employees of the firm (Armour, Gilson, & Gordon
2014). Risk oversight is likely to be a full-time job, but not one that would
create a conflict of interest in its performance.
How should a court go about making an assessment as to whether the board
has breached its fiduciary duties? Evidence as to industry practice would be a
starting point, but compliance with industry norms should not guarantee that
directors had met the required standard. All industry participants might suffer
from similar conflicts, in which case industry practice will be deficient (Epstein
1992, pp. 25–28).53 The question to which the court should address itself is the
level of oversight precaution which would be thought desirable by diversified
shareholders.
We ordinarily think in terms of breach of the duty of care generating a
liability for loss. However, given that systemic losses cannot readily be quanti-
fied, setting (or capping) liability for duty of care by reference to directors’
earnings—similar to what would be the case for duty of loyalty claims—has
desirable properties.54 It removes incentives to arbitrage role description that
might otherwise exist, and closes off the possibility of contracting around po-
tential liability by increasing pay. Moreover, it will in most cases strike a balance
between the desire to enhance deterrence while avoiding strong disincentives to
director service by the most qualified.55
53 In this regard, judicial hindsight bias (see supra text to note 21) becomes a virtue, rather than a vice,
of such liability. Precisely because industry practice is likely to be deficient, what may have appeared
to participants at the time to be “reasonable” is unlikely to be a sound guide as to the optimal level of
care.
54 Delaware Courts have in some cases sanctioned a gain-based, rather than loss-based, remedy for
breach of duty of care. See, e.g. Cede v. Technicolor, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
55 To avoid disincentive to service as a director of a systemically important financial institution, some
may think it necessary to impose a limit on earnings “look-back”, on the view that directors will not
indefinitely retain earnings against a possible future accounting. For example, in the ALI’s Principles
of Corporate Governance, the reporters’ initial suggestion was that directors face liability for breach
of the duty care, but subject to a cap of three years’ directors’ fees. This suggestion was swept away by
the complete exculpation permitted by Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 102(b)(7) and similar statutes but could
well have a place here.
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It would also be necessary to restrict the extent to which firms may insure
directors and officers against such liability.56 The practical effect of making
directors liable by reference to earnings could be achieved either by an unin-
surable liability defined by reference to earnings, or an insurable liability that
might exceed earnings with a mandatory excess defined by reference to earn-
ings. We would not propose any change to the practice of companies to insur-
ing or indemnify directors against the costs of litigation (as opposed to the
amount of any damages)—in order to permit them to defend against nuisance
suits.
7.4 Which Firms?
Our proposal would be appropriate for financial firms whose activities are
capable of imposing systemic losses. The set of such firms could be defined
by reference to regulatory designation—for example, a decision by the US
Financial Stability Oversight Council that a financial firm is “systemically
important”, or the G-20’s Financial Stability Board that a financial institu-
tion is “globally systemically important”—a so-called “G-SIFI” (listed in
Financial Stability Board 2011, p. 3). Alternatively, the scope of the set of
firms to which the duty applies could be left to judicial precedent. Among
the directors’ duties could be the determination whether the firm is “sys-
temically important”. Piggybacking on regulatory designation has the advan-
tage of clarity, but suffers from greater propensity to be undermined by
lobbying efforts against such designation or regulatory arbitrage, for ex-
ample, holding balance sheet assets below fixed threshold amounts. Either
approach would be workable, and would yield a significant improvement
upon the status quo.
7.5 Deterrence
In order to induce appropriate deterrence, expected damages payable
should in principle equal the expected social cost of activities imposing
externalities (Shavell 1987).57 In relation to systemic harms, some
56 The FDIC currently prohibits banks from providing D&O insurance that covers “Civil Money
Penalties” that can be assessed for violation of banking laws and regulations. See 12 CFR § 359.
Directors can apparently evade the force of this regulation by paying an allocated portion of the
bank’s D&O coverage that includes such liability or by obtaining a separate policy (Gerrish 2009). As
condition for taking a controllers’ position in the relevant set of financial firms, the parties should
agree not to obtain such insurance.
57 Under a negligence liability formulation, the court pronounces whether the defendant’s level of
precaution was “reasonable”, and damages are payable only if it was not. In order to induce an
appropriate level of care, the court must set the “reasonable” level of care equal to the social
optimum.
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considerations point to under-deterrence. Social losses from systemic
externalities are likely to be so large that damages reflecting them would
render any individual—or firm—bankrupt and therefore partially judg-
ment-proof. To the extent that damages exceed the defendant’s ability to
pay, they yield no marginal deterrence. In other words, the expected dam-
ages actually payable d will be far less than optimal expected damages
reflecting the full social loss, which we will term d

; that is, d  d

. To
get a feel for the size of the inequality, Bebchuk, Cohen, & Spamann
(2010) report that the senior executives of Bear Stearns and Lehman,
taking into account losses of stock in the failure of their firms, had
made net withdrawals of cash and stock from their firms totaling $1bn
during the eight years leading up to their firms’ failure; the social losses we
discussed in Section 2 were measured in trillions.
Other considerations, however, help to inflate the effective deterrence of such
liability.58 Put together, the countervailing considerations offset each other to
some degree. First, the standard framework assumes risk neutrality. Individual
directors and officers, however, are likely to be risk-averse, because the risk of
liability is not diversifiable. Risk-averse defendants view the expected cost of
damages as equal to d (1 + r), where r represents the level of risk aversion. This
is precisely why the business judgment rule ordinarily shields risk-averse dir-
ectors and officers from liability. Yet the boost to effective deterrence risk
aversion introduces can be useful if the maximum liability that can be imposed
is otherwise insufficient. The effective deterrent power of damages is thereby
raised to d 1+rð Þ (Kraakman 1984).
Second, individual directors and officers will not themselves bear the costs of
precautionary actions to mitigate the liability risk; rather, they will be borne by
the firm. If we assume an individual defendant bears some fraction 1/n of the
costs of precaution p—whether because of their equity interest in the firm, or
the necessary personal effort to implement such measures—then they will seek
to minimize the sum of (p+n d 1+rð Þ), equivalent to the expected damages being
boosted to n d 1+rð Þ. This will encourage directors to increase expenditure on
risk management activities, one of the few indicators shown to have been
associated with reduced losses during the financial crisis (Ellul & Yerramilli
2013).
We are not so sanguine as to conclude that the combination of these separate
tendencies to under- and over-deterrence, respectively, will somehow yield a
“Goldilocks” formula of perfect deterrence. What does seem likely, however, is
that their combination will result in a net divergence from optimal deterrence
58 Considered alone, these other factors might be thought to point to over-deterrence.
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that is less than in the presence of either alone. That is:
ð d





The link between systemic firm bankruptcy and systemic harm creates a par-
ticular problem for liability proposals, because policymakers will be tempted to
bail out systemically important firms so as to avoid bankruptcy. To the extent
this happens, the probability of enforcement will be very small. An obvious
implication is that liability for directors and officers should be built into “reso-
lution mechanisms”, the speeded-up versions of bankruptcy intended to re-
quire investors in systemically important firms to bear losses without triggering
systemic harms. Indeed, the FDIC has power in bank receivership proceedings
to pursue directors and officers for gross negligence,59 and the Orderly
Liquidation Authority resolution procedures of the Dodd-Frank Act follow
the strategy endorsed in this article. These permit the imposition of liability
on former senior executives or directors of failed systemically important finan-
cial institutions for negligence, with the quantum of recovery measured by
reference to their compensation over the preceding two years.60 However,
these resolution mechanisms are untested in relation to systemically important
firms. Notwithstanding anticipatory regulatory planning, which relies heavily
on the efficacy of firms’ pre-specified “resolution plans” and structural reso-
lution approaches such as “single point of entry”, the decision to put such a
firm into receivership will be perceived as highly risky, even dangerous, de-
pending on the circumstances (Armour 2014; Gordon & Ringe 2014). All
parties, government and firms, may be looking for a bail-out, some way to
avoid triggering either resolution or a bankruptcy.
Given the uncertainty over the implications of resolution, it is desirable to
impose liability for breaches of the duties of care and loyalty discussed above,
even where they do not result in the firm’s failure and the follow-on systemic
harms. The optimal number of failures of systemically important financial firms
is zero and thus it makes sense to include within the strong deterrence
59 See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (“FIRREA”), Pub. L. No.101-73,
Title II, § 212(k), 103 Stat. 243 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994)); Ramirez (1996).
Cornerstone (2014) and Laursen (NERA) (2014) present detailed summaries of FDIC litigation
against officers and directors of failed financial institutions in the post-2007 period.
60 See Dodd-Frank §§ 210(f), 210(s). The FDIC’s implementing regulations make clear that the stand-
ard is simply “negligence”, as opposed to “gross negligence”: 12 CFR § 380.7.
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penumbra those duty breaches that are associated with harms of a magnitude
and type that threaten the firm’s stability.61 In this regard, the overlap we
identify between the interests of diversified shareholders and those of society
can provide a solution. Failings in risk management will result in a distribution
of outcomes, of which only the far right tail will involve systemic losses.62 Yet
such failings will in a much larger part of the distribution be associated with
losses to the firm. Permitting the firm to sue controllers for such losses where
they flow from breaches of risk management duties would greatly increase the
likelihood that controllers would face liability. For example, the $6bn loss suf-
fered by J.P. Morgan Chase in relation to the “London Whale” trades would, on
this view, trigger liability if poor risk management were shown to be causally
relevant (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 2013).63 “The
firm” in this context means the diversified shareholders, precisely the group
whose interests are harmed by excessive risk-taking at systemic firms.64 Our
analysis suggests their interests are aligned with the interests of society in the
case of systemic harms.
Another option would be to make the duty a regulatory one, enforced by an
agency. As a general matter, the incentives of private plaintiffs to bring lawsuits
are stronger than those of public enforcers, because the former get to keep the
rewards from the litigation (Hay & Shleifer 1998). Agencies are, as we have
emphasized, subject to the problems of influence by regulated firms.65 And, as
with the strictness of substantive regulation, the intensity of public enforcement
may be expected to vary with the success or failure of the financial system
depending on the degree of political pressure exerted on agencies (Gerding
2006, pp. 433–437).
61 This could at one level be understood either as a pragmatic restriction on the circumstances giving
rise to liability—that is, to rule out strike suits for small amounts (and more paradoxical claims that
by making profits for shareholders the controllers have exposed them to systemic risk). At a more
basic level, however, it signifies the range of circumstances under which there is sufficient overlap
between the interests of diversified shareholders and those of society for it to be appropriate for the
former to act as plaintiffs.
62 That is, breaches of these duties impose probabilistic harms. Whether the breach results in the firm’s
failure may be determined by underlying market conditions or by the actions of rivals and other
market participants.
63 The question of the officers’ and directors’ negligence in the risk-taking and risk oversight that
produced the loss would presumably be contested in litigation.
64 Ordinarily, diversified shareholders would prefer not to have managers face such liability, precisely
in order to encourage risk-taking. Yet where systemic harms may result from the conduct in ques-
tion, the analysis changes, as we have shown.
65 Supra, Section 3.3.
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Here the UK provides a cautionary case-study. Senior executives and dir-
ectors of UK financial firms are subject to regulatory obligations to take rea-
sonable care in managing the business of their firms.66 However,
notwithstanding considerable evidence of mismanagement in large UK banks
(Financial Services Authority (UK) 2011, Part 3; UK Parliamentary Committee
on Banking Standards 2013), only one individual executive—Peter Cummings,
former head of Corporate Banking at HBOS plc—was ever the subject of regu-
latory enforcement proceedings. He was fined $750,000 (Financial Services
Authority (UK) 2012), which compares modestly with compensation of ap-
proximately $3.7m in the 2006–2007 financial year alone (HBOS plc 2009, p.
65). In explaining why action was not taken against other executives, the UK’s
Financial Services Authority set out a list of perceived legal obstacles as grounds
for not bringing suit (Financial Services Authority (UK) 2011, Part 3). It is hard
to imagine class action lawyers being so reticent about coming forward.67
7.7 Federal or State Law?
Fiduciary duty liability rules would rely on judges to adjudicate claims against
directors and officers of systemic firms. The most expert judges in corporate law
matters in the USA are widely thought to be those constituting the bench of
Delaware’s Court of Chancery (Kahan 2006; Cain & Davidoff 2012).68 But does
Delaware—or any other state—have any incentive to introduce liability of this
kind?
The forces of regulatory competition in corporate law, as traditionally under-
stood, seem to push against the introduction of controller liability for systemic
Delaware firms. In order to attract incorporations, states are said to have
66 Financial Services and Markets Act (UK) 2000, s 64; UK Prudential Regulatory Authority / Financial
Conduct Authority Handbook, Statements of Principle and Code of Practice for Approved Persons
(APER), APER 2.1B3, Statement of Principle 2 (“An approved person must act with due skill, care
and diligence in carrying out his accountable functions”). UK company directors are also subject to a
negligence-based duty of care, with no business judgment rule protection (Companies Act 2006
(UK), § 174). However, difficulties with derivative and class actions mean that there is effectively no
private enforcement of this duty (Armour et al. 2009).
67 As a corollary, if the probability of enforcement is very low, then a threat of liability calibrated purely
in financial terms may not itself be enough to deter misconduct (UK Parliamentary Commission on
Banking Standards 2013, pp. 512–516). In light of this, the UK has recently legislated for criminal
penalties, encompassing up to seven years in jail, against directors of banks who are found to have
been guilty of gross negligence: Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 (UK), § 36. Germany
recently adopted criminal sanctions for risk management failures for banking and insurance execu-
tives, but only where the executives “contravene[d] a specific order issued by the Federal Financial
Supervisory Authority (BaFin), the German banking and insurance regulator, to remedy insufficient
risk-management mechanisms” (Richter 2013, pp. 434–435).
68 Other courts also have expertise in commercial matters—the courts of New York, for example, are
another well-known choice (Eisenberg & Miller 2009).
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incentives to modify their corporate laws in accordance with the interests of
those making charter-selection choices. A well-known body of literature debates
whether these choices, and the corporate laws that respond to them, are made
primarily in the interests of managers or of shareholders (e.g. Bebchuk 1992;
Romano 1993). Yet on either view, systemically important firms might be ex-
pected to incorporate away from jurisdictions adopting a controller liability
rule. Managers obviously would prefer a regime without liability.
Unfortunately, so too might shareholders who focus solely on the share
price, which would go down if the firm internalized systemic harms.69
This implies that a federal law liability regime, which could not be evaded by
reincorporation, might be necessary to implement our proposal. Such a regime
might be introduced through Federal Reserve rulemaking, or might require
legislation.70 The point is not to internalize adjudication within the Federal
Reserve but to assure that these fiduciary duty cases get through to courts
who are expert at evaluating director behavior, under an appropriate liability
standard. Rulemaking or legislation of this variety would be fiercely resisted by
industry lobbying. Nevertheless, the popular salience of controller accountabil-
ity is particularly intense, such that a measure of this sort might nevertheless be
capable of being passed (see Tarullo 2014). Such measures would likely be
supported by diversified shareholders. Although they face coordination costs
as regards intervention in any individual company’s affairs, the same does not
hold as regards political intervention, which may be expected to yield benefits
across their entire portfolio (Black 1992).
Yet the mere possibility of federal intervention could itself spur Delaware to
action. In recent years, the most powerful driver of innovation in Delaware
corporate law has not been inter-state competition, but rather the threat of
federal pre-emption (Roe 2003; 2005). If Delaware law permits controllers to
ramp up systemic risk in a way that harms diversified shareholders, then the
latter may be expected to seek recourse in Washington. And controllers of
systemic firms would calculate that reincorporating away from Delaware
69 See supra, Section 4.2.
70 For example, the Federal Reserve could require firms designated as systemically important under
Title I of Dodd-Frank, and other bank-holding companies above specified asset thresholds, to
incorporate in a jurisdiction that permits charter provisions that impose officer and director liability
and then, by regulation, describe the required charter terms; or perhaps simply require that the
charters of such firms omit any opt-out from monetary liability for duty breach as might be other-
wise permitted by state law. The point is to make clear that a robust set of fiduciary standards,
including negligence liability in appropriate cases, applies to the officers and directors of systemically
significant financial institutions, and leave fact-finding and calibration to the courts. Such a course is
likely to be preferable to the Fed’s trying to create a private cause of action directly.
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under such circumstances would likely provoke Federal intervention; from their
perspective, a trip from the frying pan into the fire.
8 . C O N C L U S I O N
The normal framework within which we think about corporate law and gov-
ernance urges those running a corporation to maximize the value of share-
holders’ claims, as measured by the stock price. The SVM norm encourages
managers to make decisions as diversified shareholders would, were these share-
holders not beset by collective action problems. But if the firm’s owners don’t
bear the full social costs of their activities, then the SVM norm will encourage
managers to act in a way that increases social costs. The standard response to
weaknesses in internalization mechanisms is to argue for an improvement of
these mechanisms, not a weakening of the SVM norm itself.
We have argued that the recent financial crisis calls this accommodation into
question as regards financial firms whose activities are systemically important.
We have made three claims. First, the extent to which traditional private law
mechanisms—in particular, the law of tort—fail to internalize systemic harms
has been under-appreciated. In particular, the economic nature of the losses
occasioned by systemic harms, and the causal link between financial-firm fail-
ure and the infliction of these harms, mean that the usual technique of impos-
ing tort liability on the firm cannot gain traction on the problem. This causal
link is unique to financial firms, which renders the internalization of their
systemic risks particularly weak under current arrangements. In this regard,
financial firms are different.
Second, we have argued that the SVM norm creates incentives for firms
systematically to undermine the efficacy of regulatory internalization.
Our third claim is that, where the harms are systemic, even the firm’s diver-
sified shareholders, its majoritarian owners, would rather that the managers did
not impose externalities. Risks of systemic harms—that is, affecting the econ-
omy at large—increase the undiversifiable portion of investors’ risk. In relation
to projects with such potential consequences, diversified investors should not
want managers to single-mindedly maximize share prices. As a result, a system
in which “shareholder value” is interpreted as share price maximization is
paradoxically not aligning managers’ interests with those of dispersed share-
holders, at least as regards systemic risks.
It is therefore appropriate to relax the SVM norm in the case of systemically
important financial firms. In addition to regulatory changes to compensation
practices in such firms, we make the case for the complementary imposition of
liability for directors and officers. Such liability, appropriately structured,
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makes agents behave in a more risk-averse fashion, which the conventional
wisdom underpinning the business judgment rule suggests is contrary to the
interests of diversified shareholders. Our analysis reveals that when a firm’s
actions affect systemic risk, the conventional wisdom is reversed: diversified
shareholders want managers to take less risk. This undercuts the case for busi-
ness judgment protection. We have argued that director and officer liability has
a potentially useful role to play in circumscribing the limits of shareholder
value. Such liability would be owed to the firm, and could be triggered by a
shareholder action following the occurrence of significant losses.
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